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FREEDOM OF ATTENTION FOR TRANSIT RIDERS

Early in 1949 the patrons of public transportation in several large
American cities found themselves lurching forward to the accompaniment of soft FM radio music liberally interspersed with short
commercial announcements.1 Reactions among the passengers were
2
varied. Many felt that the music had "a soothing, relaxing effect,"

but others were vociferous in disapproval, and feared that the cacophony of music and audible advertisements was "a dark plot against
sanity."3 Transit Radio, Incorporated, the Cincinnati firm which
pioneered the idea, felt that it had launched a highly promising commercial venture, and as one periodical put it, "If the newly formed
Transit Radio, Inc., has its way, strap-hangers all over the nation
will soon be bouncing along to the strains of the 'Missouri Waltz'
and 'Pepsi-Cola Hits the Spot.'4

Transit Radio's hope for business success was predicated on a
scheme whereby it could guarantee to a group of advertisers the ear
of an audience which would have no choice but to listen. In the
usual arrangement, it would install radio receivers in the vehicles of
a public transit firm and agree to pay a fixed fee plus a percentage
of the receipts from advertisers for an exclusive broadcast franchise.
Then it would make an agreement with a local FM radio station to
conduct programs of music, news, and advertising designed especially
for the commuter. Since the receivers in these busses and streetcars
were tuned to the one station and could not be turned off or controlled from the vehicles, the transit riders became a captive audience
in the sense that they must either listen or get off.5

:Business Week, Feb. 5, 1949, p. 64, col. 3.
2News Week, Nov. 7, 1949, p. 54, col. 2. These words were reported as being
spoken by a witness at a hearing held by the Washington, D. C., Public Utilities
Commission in an attempt to determine whether transit broadcasting was consistent with "public convenience, comfort and safety." This hearing is discussed at
page 94 infra.
3News Week, Nov. 7, 1949, p. 54, col. 2.
4
Business Week, Feb. 14, 1948, p. 38, col. 2, p. 40, col. 3.
5Such a project presented a delightful prospect for the advertiser, for the
transit company, and for Transit Radio, but to elements of the riding public
and to some members of the press the outlook was disturbing. The New Yorker
commented that "An audience in captivity is a new stunt in this republic, although it is old stuff elsewhere. Hitler captured his audience and found it quite
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Finally, as was to be expected, the critics of transit broadcasting
determined to seek legal protection from this assault on their attention. The natural resort was to attempt to fit the new and unfamiliar situation into the scope of existing legal remedies. This
treatment suggested three possible attacks.6 First, from the tort
aspect, transit radio could conceivably be termed a nuisance. Second,
with public transportation already closely regulated by legislatively
created administrative bodies, relief might be had by application to a
local public service commission. Third, in a broader sense the captive listener might successfully charge that transit broadcasting was
a violation of the constitutional guarantees of the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
The Common Law Nuisance Argument. Those desiring to put
an end to transit broadcasting could not rely on the law of private
nuisance because it applies only to an interference with a right in
real property,7 and no such offense had been committed against the
captive listener. Public nuisance, however, has been broadly defined
as "an act or omission which obstructs or causes inconvenience or
damage to the public in the exercise of rights common to all." s It
includes interference with the public peace by loud and disturbing
noises. 9 The late Justice Cardozo remarked that "The organs of
smell and hearing, assailed by sounds and odors too pungent to be
borne, have been ever favored of the law," 10 and in the same opinion
he pointed out that the test for nuisance by sound was the "effect
useful while it lasted. The Soviet leaders have their audience nailed down fast and
are currently finding it useful." New Yorker, Dec. 10, 1949, p. 29, col. 2. The widely
drculated Readers' Digest deplored: "This is almost an hour a day that thousands
of students count upon for study, and millions of other folk use for reading or
for quiet relaxation. It is their time, but it no longer is theirs to use as they
wish. It has been stolen from them and sold for commercial profit." Harvey,
Must We All Join the Captive Audience?, Readers' Digest, July, 1951, pp. 20, 21.

6These approaches were suggested and analyzed by at least two legal writers.

See Shipley, Some Constitutional Aspects of Transit Radio, 11 FED. CoM. B.J. 150
(1950); Note, 51 COL. L. REv. 108 (1951).
7RESTATEMENT, TORTS c. 40, Intro. Note (1939).
SPROsSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 566 (1941).
OPeople v. Rubenfeld, 254 N.Y. 245, 172 N.E. 485 (1930); Town of Davis v.
Davis, 40 W. Va. 464, 21 S.E. 906 (1895).
lOPeople v. Rubenfeld, 254 N.Y. 245, 248, 172 N.E. 485, 486 (1930).
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of the offensive practice upon the reasonable man or woman of average
sensibilities."11 It is apparent that transit broadcasting could logically
be attacked as a noise disturbing to the public peace, but a question
remains as to whether under the Cardozo test the broadcasting would
be declared to be offensive to the sensibilities of the reasonable man.
Even if this uncertainty were to be determined in favor of an aggrieved
listener, he would still have to show special damages distinct from
those sustained in common with the general public before he would
be allowed to maintain an action at law for damages12 or to seek
equitable relief by injunctiona from the public nuisance. Furthermore, mental distress would likely be the damage alleged, and, inasmuch as a majority of courts have refused to allow recovery upon
such grounds without attendant physical consequences, 4 tort redress
does not appear feasible. Accordingly, it became necessary for the
transit riders to consider the other remedies that had been suggested.
Attack through the Regulatory Commission. Public service commissions in most of the states have been given control over the services
rendered by street railway companies, 15 with power to prescribe
standards "for safety, speed, regularity, and general regulation of
transportation companies.' 6 If transit radio could be shown to be an
:1ld. at 248, 172 N.E. at 487.
12"Tort liability for public nuisance seems to have originated in 1536, when
it was first held that the action would lie if the plaintiff could show that he had
suffered special damage over and above the ordinary damage caused to the public
at large by the nuisance. This qualification has persisted, and it is uniformly held
that a private individual has no action for the invasion of the purely public right,
unless his damage is in some way to be distinguished from that sustained by other
members of the general public. Redress of the wrong to the community must be
left to its appointed representatives. The best reason that has been given for the
rule is that it relieves the defendant of the multiplicity of actions which might
follow if everyone were free to sue for the common harm." PROSSER, HANDBOOK
569 (1941).
§165 (2d ed. 1948).
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS

OF THE LAW OF TORTS

13McCLINTOCK, EQUITY

14See PROSSER,
COL. L. REV. 108, 113 (1951).
1

5MOSHER AND CRAWFORD, PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION

§11

(1941);

Note, 51

173 (1933).

161d. at 163. Many states have modeled their laws establishing public utility
commissions along the lines of the Wisconsin and New York statutes. Therefore
the sections of those statutes pertinent to control over rapid transit are set out
here. The Wisconsin statute provides: "Whenever the commission shall find any

existing rate, fare, charge, or classification, or any joint rate, or any regulation
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undue hindrance to the proper operation of a public transit system,
a public service commission would order a cessation of the broadcasting. Moreover, the regulatory commission provided a remedy that
was more easily available than that provided by the law of nuisance
approach. Therefore, the first attack on transit broadcasting was instituted in the District of Columbia Public Utilities Commission
against the Capital Transit Company of Washington, D. C., in October
of 1949.17 The hearing was limited to the single determination as to
whether or not radio receivers in streetcars and busses were "consistent with public convenience, comfort, and safety."", The Commission concluded that the broadcasting in no way constituted a violation of the provision of the Act requiring adequate service; in fact,
the Commission decided that service was made better by the entertainment provided the riding public. 19 Thus, the attack through the
regulatory commission failed.
The Constitutional Argument. The objecting passengers at the
Washington hearing'had maintained that the use of radio receivers
deprived riders of freedom to listen or not to listen in violation of
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, and that it
also encroached upon their liberty and deprived them of their
property in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. However, the Commission ignored these arguments as being
irrelevant to the issue of whether the broadcasts impaired public
safety or comfort.2 0 After the final administrative order was entered
dismissing this investigation, an appeal was prosecuted to the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia,21 but the court
or practice affecting the transportation of persons or property, or any service in
connection therewith is unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory or any service is inadequate it shall determine and by order fix a reasonable rate,
fare, charge, classification, joint rate, regulation, practice or service to be imposed,
ITRe Capital Transit Company, 81 P.U.R. (N.s.) 122 (1950). Although the
Commission on its own motion issued the order instituting the investigation somewhat earlier, the formal hearings were not begun until October, 1949.
'sRe Capital Transit Company, 81 P.U.R. (N.s.) 122, 123 (1950).
iold. at 126.
201d. at 123.
21"Any public utility or any other person or corporation affected by any final

order or decision of the Commission, other than an order fixing or determining the
value of the property of a public utility in a proceeding solely for that purpose,
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thought that "there is no legal right of the petitioners that has been
invaded, threatened or violated," 22 and consequently the petition was
dismissed. Appeal was then taken to the United States Court of ApAppeals.
Recently in Pollak v. Public Utilities Commission23 the Court of
Appeals unanimously held in favor of the appellant transit riders.
The holding was based entirely on the deprivation of liberty argument, which was found to be so compelling that the court did not
deem it necessary to discuss the abridgement of speech 24 or the deprivation of property25 arguments. Judge Edgerton declared:26
"In our opinion Transit's broadcasts deprive objecting passengers of liberty without due process of law. Service that violates
constitutional rights is not reasonable service. It follows that
the Commission erred as a matter of law in finding that Transit's
broadcasts are not inconsistent with public convenience, in failing
to find that they are unreasonable, and in failing to stop them."
may . . ." appeal to the District Court of the United States for the District of
Columbia, and "Any party, including said Commission, may appeal from the order
or decree of said court to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia ....
" D.C. CoDE tit. 43, §705 (1940). Under this section Franklin S.
Pollak and Guy Martin, who had been allowed to intervene in the hearing held
before the Commissions, prosecuted an appeal as "persons affected." It was held
in United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 151 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1945), that
the term "person affected" includes a consumer of a public utility company.
22As quoted in Washington Post, June 2, 1951, p. 1, col. 1. There is no report
available.
23191 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1951). The Supreme Court granted a petition for
review on writ of certiorari on October 15, 1951.
24
Since the Supreme Court had recognized the right to receive a protected communication in Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 143 (1943), it was argued that
this "right appears to include the negative freedom not to receive the communication." Note, 51 COL. L. REv. 108, 116 (1951). The analogy was drawn to McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), wherein the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of religion was held to include freedom not to have a religion.
25"If the attention of the transit riders is of commercial value to the FM station
and its advertisers, it would seem to be another class of intangible property having
sufficient value to the individual to come within the protection of the Constitution." Shipley, supra note 6, at 160.
26
Pollak v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 191 F.2d 450, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1951). It
should be noticed that the court held that the commission erred as a matter of
law. In determination of an appeal from an order or decision of the commission,
the review is limited to questions of law, D.C. CODE tit. 43, §706 (1940).
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NOTES
Since the Pollak case is a case of first impression recognizing an
important new constitutional right of freedom from forced listening
or freedom of attention, it becomes extremely important that close
scrutiny be given to the reasoning which led to the conclusion reached.
The court started with the well-established principle that the
constitutional guarantees of liberty are directed only against governmental action.27 Here the court found governmental action involved
in the sense that Congress granted a franchise to the transit company
by which, for all practical purposes, it became a monopoly, thereby
making it necessary for the members of the public who depended on
the company for transportation to ride in the vehicles in which the
offending sounds were present. Hence, the forced listening resulted
from governmental action. The court cited no authority, but its
28
proposition can be substantiated by analogy to Shelley v. Kraemer,
where state action was found in the judicial enforcement of a restrictive covenant between private parties. In the transit radio situation it can be said that the congressionally sanctioned monopoly
enabled the privately operated transit firm to recruit a captive audience, "supported," as the Shelley case said, "by the full panoply of
state power." 29 Furthermore, the court pointed out that the utilities
commission, an agency of government, sanctioned the broadcasts when
its negative order dismissed the investigation and allowed the forced
30
listening to continue.
Once it had been found that there was governmental action involved in the transit radio scheme, the next step was to decide if any
constitutional right had been violated by this action. There was no
direct authority to cover the assault by decibel on a captive group,
27"The Fifth Amendment 'is a limitation only upon the powers of the General
Government,' . . . and is not directed against the action of individuals." Corrigan
v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926). The Fourteenth has "reference to State action
exclusively, and not to any action of private -individuals." Virginia v. Rives, 100

U.S. 313, 318 (1880).
28334 U.S. 1 (1948); see Note, 6

WASH. & Lr L. RPv. 192 (1949).
The power used in the Pollak case was that of the
federal government and therefore the Court was called on to enforce the safeguards of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
30The court quoted the Supreme Court to the effect that "An order . . . dismissing a complaint on the merits and maintaining the status quo is an exercise
of administrative function, no more and no less, than an order directing some
change in status." Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 142 (1939).
Mr. Justice Frankfurter gives an extensive discussion of so-called negative orders.

29334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948).
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but there were a number of cases which had vaguely intimated that
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
might be broad enough to include a freedom of attention. As early
as 1897 in Allgeyer v. Louisiana the United States Supreme Court
clearly recognized that the "liberty" mentioned in the Due Process
Clauses is "deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in
"..."31Shortly thereafter, Brannon
the enjoyment of all his faculties .
reiterated this principle and cited copious case authority to show that
the word "liberty" was a generic term embracing "almost all the
essential rights of the person." 32 In 1928 Justice Brandeis, speaking
in a dissent in Olmstead v. United States, insisted that the makers of
the Constitution . . . sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred,
as against the government, the right to be let alone-the most com33
prehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. "
In a dissent in Martin v. Struthers, a case which struck down an
ordinance forbidding house-to-house canvassing as a violation of freedom of speech and press, Justice Reed was insistent in asserting that
"The First Amendment does not compel a pedestrian to pause on the
street to listen to the argument supporting another's views of religion or politics. Once the door is opened, the visitor may not insert a foot and insist on a hearing."' 4
More recently Justice Frankfurter in a dissent in Saia v. New
York, 35 in which Justices Reed and Burton concurred, gave concrete
form to this concept of freedom of attention. So pertinent was the
language that it might have been designed and phrased to cover the
36
transit radio situation:
"The native power of human speech can interfere little with
the self-protection of those who do not wish to listen. They may
31165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). Although this was the first case in which clear
recognition was given to such a definition of liberty, it was not the first case to
indicate that liberty might be so broadly construed. See Justice Bradley's concurring
opinion in Butchers' Union Slaughter House v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing
Co., 111 U.S. 746, 760, 762 (1884).
32BRANNON,

A

TREATISE

ON THE RIGHTS AND

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION

PRIVILEGES GUARANTEED

BY

THE

115 (1901).

3277 U.S. 438, 471, 478 (1928).
'4319 U.S. 141, 154, 157 (1943).

35334 U.S. 558 (1948); see Note, 2 U. OF
36334 U.S. 558, 563 (1948).
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NOTES
easily move beyond earshot, just as those who do not choose to
read need not have their attention bludgeoned by undesired
reading matter. And so utterances by speech or pen can neither
be forbidden nor licensed, save in the familiar classes of exceptional situations. . . But modem devices for amplifying the
range and volume of the voice, or its recording, afford easy, too
easy, opportunities for aural aggression. If uncontrolled, the result is intrusion into cherished privacy. The refreshment of mere
silence, or meditation, or quiet conversation, may be disturbed
or precluded by noise beyond one's personal control."
The latest pronouncement from the Court on the right of freedom of attention was made in Kovacs v. Cooper,37 a decision which
upheld a municipal ordinance prohibiting the operation from vehicles upon city streets of sound amplifiers which emitted "loud
and raucous noises." Justice Reed, a staunch proponent of freedom
of attention, spoke for three justices: 38
"The unwilling listener is not like the passer-by who may be
offered a pamphlet in the street but cannot be made to take it.
In his home or on the street he is practically helpless to escape
this interference with his privacy by loud speakers except through
the protection of the municipality."
The Kovacs case completed the progression of statements that enabled the Court of Appeals in the Pollak case to give, for the first
time, an express recognition to freedom of attention as a constitutionally protected right. The court adopted the Allgeyer proposition
that the "liberty" included in the Due Process Clause encompasses
the right to free enjoyment of faculties, concluding that one who
is forced to listen is not free to use his faculties. Then it turned to
the Kovacs case and reasoned that the upholding of the ordinance
against "loud and raucous" sound amplifiers mounted on trucks
meant that the public interest in freedom of attention was so important that it outweighed the public interest in broadcasting a communication protected under the Free Speech Clause of the First

37S36

U.S. 77 (1949); see Note, 2 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 257 (1950).

S8336 U.S. 77, 86 (1949); see Note, 6 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 74 (1949), for a

discussion of the voting line-up of the justices in this case.
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Amendment.3 9 By analogy it follows that public interest in freedom
of attention outweighs a private commercial interest in transit broadcasting which is not protected 40 by the First Amendment.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Court of Appeals limited itself
solely to the commercial aspects of transit radio, the reasoning of
the decision would be equally valid in a situation where only occasional broadcasts of music were made. It would seem that if a
passenger has the right to be free from the harrassment of the commercially operated program, he would also have the right to a totally
silent radio. However, freedom of attention is not absolute. Urban
life necessitates the suffering of some noise, and a passenger of modern rapid transit cannot complain that those noises which are the
ordinary incidents of such travel infringe upon his freedom of attention. Some discomforts may perhaps be inevitable, but the forced
listening to a radio even if it does send forth only occasional music
41
is "neither incidental nor inevitable."'
WILLIAM

C.

BEATTY

Washington and Lee University

39Pollak v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 191 F.2d 450, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
40Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). This case held that public
streets are proper places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating information, and that while states may regulate such communications they may not
unduly burden its employment in thoroughfaies, but there is no such restraint
placed on the states in regard to commercial advertising. Packer Corp. v. Utah,
285 U.S. 105 (1932), indicates that advertising of the sort involved in transit
broadcasting could be regulated or even prohibited if necessary to protect the
public. In that case street car placards and billboards were classified separately
from other advertising media because "In the case of newspapers and magazines,
there must be some seeking by the one who is to see and read the advertisement.
The radio can be turned off, but not so the billboard or street car placard." Id.
at 110.
4'Pollak v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 191 F.2d 450, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
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